Liberty University v. Geithner - Amicus Brief of Revere America Foundation by Revere American Foundation
Santa Clara Law
Santa Clara Law Digital Commons
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
Litigation Research Projects and Empirical Data
1-1-2011
Liberty University v. Geithner - Amicus Brief of
Revere America Foundation
Revere American Foundation
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/aca
Part of the Health Law Commons
This Amicus Brief is brought to you for free and open access by the Research Projects and Empirical Data at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Litigation by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Automated Citation
Revere American Foundation, "Liberty University v. Geithner - Amicus Brief of Revere America Foundation" (2011). Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act Litigation. Paper 203.
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/aca/203
 No. 10-2347 
________________________________________ 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
 
 
LIBERTY UNIVERSITY, a Virginia Nonprofit Corporation;  
MICHELE G. WADDELL; JOANNE V. MERRILL, 
   
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
v. 
 
TIMOTHY GEITHNER, Secretary of the Treasury of the United States,  
in his official capacity; KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, Secretary of the United 
States Department of Health and Human Services, in her official capacity; 
HILDA L. SOLIS, Secretary of the United States Department of Labor,  
in her official capacity; ERIC HOLDER, JR., Attorney General of the United 
States, in his official capacity, 
 
    Defendants-Appellees. 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
BRIEF OF REVERE AMERICA FOUNDATION AS AMICUS CURIAE  
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS 
 
Brian S. Koukoutchos 
28 Eagle Trace 
Mandeville, LA 70471 
(985) 626-5052 
 
 
Charles J. Cooper 
    Counsel of Record 
David H. Thompson 
COOPER & KIRK, PLLC 
1523 New Hampshire Ave., N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
(202) 220-9600 
(202) 220-9601 Fax 
Attorneys for Revere America Foundation 
January 25, 2011 
Case: 10-2347   Document: 17    Date Filed: 01/25/2011    Page: 1
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 
DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE AFFILIATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTS 
Only one form needs to be completed for a party even if the party is represented by more than 
one attorney.  Disclosures must be filed on behalf of all parties to a civil, agency, bankruptcy or 
mandamus case.  Corporate defendants in a criminal or post-conviction case and corporate amici 
curiae are required to file disclosure statements.  Counsel has a continuing duty to update this 
information.  
_______ Caption: __________________________________________________No.
Pursuant to FRAP 26.1 and Local Rule 26.1, 
______________________ who is _______________________, makes the following disclosure: 
 (name of party/amicus)  (appellant/appellee/amicus)  
1. Is party/amicus a publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity? YES NO
2. Does party/amicus have any parent corporations? YES NO
If yes, identify all parent corporations, including grandparent and great-grandparent 
corporations: 
3. Is 10% or more of the stock of a party/amicus owned by a publicly held corporation or 
other publicly held entity? YES NO
 If yes, identify all such owners: 
4. Is there any other publicly held corporation or other publicly held entity that has a direct 
financial interest in the outcome of the litigation (Local Rule 26.1(b))?  YES NO
 If yes, identify entity and nature of interest: 
5. Is party a trade association? (amici curiae do not complete this question)  YES NO
If yes, identify any publicly held member whose stock or equity value could be affected 
substantially by the outcome of the proceeding or whose claims the trade association is 
pursuing in a representative capacity, or state that there is no such member: 
6. Does this case arise out of a bankruptcy proceeding?  YES NO
If yes, identify any trustee and the members of any creditors’ committee:
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
**************************
I certify that on _________________ the foregoing document was served on all parties or their
counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users or, if they are not, by 
serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below:
_______________________________ ________________________
      (signature)                (date) 
10-2347
January 25, 2011
s/ Charles J. Cooper 1/25/2011
Liberty University et al. v. Geithner et al.
Revere America Foundation Amicus
✔
✔
✔
✔
✔
Anita Leigh Staver
Mathew D. Staver
LIBERTY COUNSEL
1055 Maitland Center Commons
Maitland, FL 32751-0000
Stephen Melvin Crampton
LIBERTY COUNSEL
P. O. Box 11108
Lynchburg, VA 24506-1108
Case: 10-2347   Document: 17    Date Filed: 01/25/2011    Page: 2
 i
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................... ii 
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ................................................................ 1 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ............................. 2 
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................. 4   
THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE EXCEEDS CONGRESSIONAL 
AUTHORITY UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND THE 
NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE. ...................................................... 4 
I. THE GOVERNMENT CONCEDES THAT THE INDIVIDUAL  
MANDATE LIES AT THE OUTER LIMITS OF THE COMMERCE 
CLAUSE, AS AUGMENTED BY THE NECESSARY AND PROPER 
CLAUSE. ...................................................................................... 4  
II. CONGRESS HAS NO POWER TO COMPEL AN UNWILLING 
INDIVIDUAL TO ENTER THE STREAM OF COMMERCE TO 
PURCHASE AN UNWANTED PRODUCT. ........................................ 7  
A. None of the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause 
Decisions Authorizes Regulation of Inactivity. ............... 7  
B. The Government’s Supposed Statutory and Lower  
Court Precedents Likewise Involved No Regulation  
of Inactivity. ................................................................... 14 
C. The Government Proffers No Genuine Limiting  
Principle to Contain a Commerce Clause Power That  
Is Not Tethered To Any Activity, Let Alone to  
Economic Activity. ........................................................ 19  
1. The Government’s assertion that the health care 
market is “unique” does not furnish a limiting 
principle and, in any event, is wrong................... 19 
2. A statute is not “proper” under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause if it would negate the  
purpose, embodied in Article I and the Ninth  
and Tenth Amendments, of enumerating, and 
thereby limiting, federal power. .......................... 24  
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 30 
 
Case: 10-2347   Document: 17    Date Filed: 01/25/2011    Page: 3
 ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases           Page 
Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548 (1897) .......................................................... 17 
Commonwealth v. Sebelius, No. 10-188,  
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130814 (E.D.Va. Dec. 13, 2010) ............. 9, 12, 18 
County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981) ............................. 20  
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) ................................................. 5, 10, 11 
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) ..................... 13 
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) ............................................... 5 
Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125922  
(W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010) ....................................... 4, 9, 10, 11, 12, 20, 24 
McCulloch v.  Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) .............................................. 25 
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) ................................... 24, 25, 30  
United States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. 72 (1838) .................................................. 5 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) ......................................... passim 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) ............................................ 7 
United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997) ........................ 15 
United States v. Sage, 92 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1996) ....................................... 15 
United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10 (1994) .............................................. 30  
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) ............................................... 10, 11 
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) ................................................. 30  
Other 
U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 ............................................................................ 18 
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 .................................................................................... 16 
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ............................................................................ 18 
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-13 ................................................................... 18 
U.S. Const. Amend. VI ................................................................................. 18 
U.S. Const. Amend. VII ................................................................................ 18 
U.S. Const. Amend. XVI .............................................................................. 18 
Case: 10-2347   Document: 17    Date Filed: 01/25/2011    Page: 4
 iii
Fed. R. App. P. 29 ........................................................................................... 1 
Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1501(b), 10106, 124 Stat. 119, 244, 907 (2010) ..... 2 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 33 ................................................................................ 27 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) ........................................... 16 
1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 759 (J. Gales & W. Seaton ed. 1834) ................... 29 
2 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION  
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 436 (reprint 1966)  
(J. Elliot 2d ed. 1836) (statement of J. Wilson at Pennsylvania Ratifying 
Convention, Oct. 28, 1787) ..................................................................... 28 
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT, Requiring Individuals to 
Obtain Health Insurance: A Constitutional Analysis 6 (2009) ............... 26  
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE MEMORANDUM: Budgetary  
Treatment of an Individual Mandate to Buy Health Insurance  9  
(1994) ................................................................................... 4, 9, 16, 23, 24  
Charles Cooper, Limited Government and Individual Liberty: The Ninth 
Amendment’s Forgotten Lessons, 4 J. OF L. & POLITICS 63 (1987) ........ 28 
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 432 (G. Hunt. Ed. 1904)  
(letter to G. Washington dated Dec. 5, 1789) .......................................... 29 
John Marshall’s Defense of McCulloch v. Maryland 186  
(Gerald Gunther ed. 1969) ....................................................................... 26  
John William Salmond, JURISPRUDENCE § 39 (2d ed. 1907) ....................... 31    
 
Case: 10-2347   Document: 17    Date Filed: 01/25/2011    Page: 5
 1
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1 
 
The Revere America Foundation (“Revere America”) is an advocacy 
organization dedicated to advancing common sense public policies rooted in 
America’s traditions of individual freedom and free markets.  Revere 
America supports and advocates reform of our health care system through 
measures that are compatible with these values, including improving access 
to medical care, providing incentives for innovation and encouraging 
competition. Revere America opposes stripping Americans of the freedom to 
make their own individual decisions about medical care by forcing people to 
purchase health insurance or incur a government penalty.    
                                              
1 The parties have consented to the filing of this brief.  No counsel for 
any party authored this brief in whole or in part, nor did any person or entity, 
other than amicus and its counsel, make a monetary contribution to the 
preparation and submission of this brief.  See Fed. R. App. P. 29.   
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 The importance of this case cannot be overstated, for it presents this 
Court with a rare instance in which it must face its “responsibility to 
confront the great questions of the proper federal balance in terms of lasting 
consequences for the constitutional design.”  United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549, 578 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  At issue is whether 
Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and 
Proper Clause to enact, for the first time in American history, a law 
compelling individual Americans to purchase a consumer product that they 
do not want.  Section 1501 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
contains an individual mandate (“Individual Mandate”) that seeks to compel 
most people to purchase health insurance policies by 2014.  See Pub. L. No. 
111-148, § 1501(b), § 10106, 124 Stat. 119, 244, 907 (2010). 
 Although the Supreme Court’s modern Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence has gradually eliminated the distinction between interstate and 
intrastate commerce, the Court has never doubted its “duty to recognize 
meaningful limits on the commerce power of Congress,” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 
580 (Kennedy, J., concurring), lest the limited and enumerated powers 
granted in Article I become the general federal police power that the 
Framers deliberately withheld.  The Court has insisted, accordingly, that 
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Congress’ commerce power be confined to the regulation of “economic 
activity.”  See id. at 567 (opinion of the Court). 
 The Individual Mandate, however, is triggered not by economic 
activity, but rather by an individual’s private decision not to engage in 
economic activity.  Section 1501 regulates inactivity, conscripting unwilling 
individuals into the commercial market to buy an unwanted product.  The 
Individual Mandate thus introduces compulsory commerce into the 
American economy – commerce that Congress not only regulates, but 
creates.  If Congress has power to regulate inactivity in this fashion, then 
one is “hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is 
without power to regulate.”  Id. at 564 (emphasis added).  Such a sweeping 
regulatory power effectively ousts the states of their reserved governmental 
powers and thus violates the Tenth Amendment. 
But the Individual Mandate commits a constitutional offense that is 
graver still.  For the Individual Mandate operates directly on individuals, and 
to the extent that it exceeds Congress’ enumerated powers, it infringes on the 
retained constitutional rights of the people, rights specifically protected by 
the Ninth Amendment.  And while it is difficult to posit what Congress 
could not do with the regulatory power it claims here, it is not at all difficult 
to posit what it could do.  Indeed, Congress’ own budget office, concerned 
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that federally mandated private expenditures ought to be included in the 
federal budget, understood that implementation of such a power could lead 
to, “[i]n the extreme, a command economy, in which the President and the 
Congress dictated how much each individual and family spent on all goods 
and services. . . .” CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE MEMORANDUM: 
Budgetary Treatment of an Individual Mandate to Buy Health Insurance 9 
(1994) (“CBO MEMORANDUM”).  Our Constitution grants Congress no such 
power.    
 ARGUMENT 
 
THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE EXCEEDS CONGRESSIONAL 
AUTHORITY UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND THE 
NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE. 
 
I. THE GOVERNMENT CONCEDES THAT THE INDIVIDUAL 
MANDATE LIES AT THE OUTER LIMITS OF THE COMMERCE 
CLAUSE, AS AUGMENTED BY THE NECESSARY AND PROPER 
CLAUSE. 
 
The court below upheld the Individual Mandate as “within Congress’ 
authority under the Commerce Clause” standing alone, and therefore found 
it “unnecessary to consider whether the provision[] would be [a] 
constitutional exercise[] of power pursuant to … the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.”  Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125922, at *39 
(W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010).  This is plainly wrong.  The Government itself 
conceded below that it must rely on the Necessary and Proper Clause to 
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sustain the Individual Mandate.  Govt. Mem. in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss at 1, 23, 27; Govt. Reply Mem. at 7.  The Individual Mandate 
regulates neither the “channels of interstate commerce” nor 
“instrumentalities[,] … persons or things in interstate commerce,” Gonzales 
v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16-17 (2005), and the Government does not contend 
otherwise.  Therefore the mandate lies beyond Congress’ Commerce Clause 
power and can be sustained, if at all, only as an exercise of power under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause to “regulate purely local activities that are part 
of an economic ‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.” Id. at 17.  See Govt. Mem. at 27.  “[U]nlike the channels, 
instrumentalities, and agents of interstate commerce, activities that 
substantially affect interstate commerce are not themselves part of interstate 
commerce, and thus the power to regulate them cannot come from the 
Commerce Clause alone.  Rather, as [the Supreme Court] has acknowledged 
since at least United States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. 72 (1838), Congress’ 
regulatory authority over intrastate activities that are not themselves part of 
interstate commerce (including activities that have a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce) derives from the Necessary and Proper Clause.”  
Raich, 545 U.S. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).  See, e.g., 
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 301-02 (1964).   
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The Government, accordingly, seeks to defend the Individual Mandate 
as necessary to ensure the effectiveness of Congress’ principal reforms of 
the interstate health care and health insurance markets:  extending coverage 
to those with costly preexisting medical conditions and preventing premiums 
based on individual medical history.  Unless everyone is required by law to 
purchase health insurance (or to pay a penalty), the revenue base will be 
insufficient to underwrite the costs of insuring individuals presently deemed 
high risk or uninsurable.  Therefore, the Government reasons, insofar as 
Congress has power under the Commerce Clause to reform the interstate 
health insurance market, it also possesses, under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, power to make the regulation effective by imposing the Individual 
Mandate.  Govt. Mem. at 26-29.   
As we demonstrate below, however, if Congress has power to regulate 
“commerce” in the health insurance market by commanding unwilling 
individuals to engage in specific commercial transactions in that market, 
there is no principled reason why it cannot likewise regulate commerce by 
issuing similar commands in virtually any other market for goods and 
services.  And such a breathtaking, wholly unprecedented regulatory power 
would “bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce 
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Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States.”  Lopez, 
514 U.S. at 567.       
II. CONGRESS HAS NO POWER TO COMPEL AN UNWILLING 
INDIVIDUAL TO ENTER THE STREAM OF COMMERCE TO 
PURCHASE AN UNWANTED PRODUCT.  
 
A. None of the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause 
Decisions Authorizes Regulation of Inactivity.  
 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Lopez, provides the framework for 
analyzing assertions of congressional power that lie at the outermost reaches 
of the Commerce and the Necessary and Proper Clauses – particularly 
assertions that are without precedent.  In Lopez, the Court invalidated a 
federal statute criminalizing possession of guns near schools.  Noting that 
“even the[] modern-era precedents which have expanded congressional 
power under the Commerce Clause confirm that this power is subject to 
outer limits,” id. at 556-57, the Court found in those precedents the common 
feature that they all involved the regulation of some type of “economic 
activity” that affected interstate commerce, id. at 559.  See id. at 560 (“Even 
Wickard, which is perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce 
Clause authority over intrastate activity, involved economic activity.”).  See 
also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (“Gender-
motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic 
activity. . . .   [T]hus far in our Nation’s history our cases have upheld 
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Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is 
economic in nature.”). 
The activity at issue in Lopez fell outside these precedents because it 
was not meaningfully “connected with a commercial transaction” or 
otherwise economic in nature.  514 U.S. at 561.  And because the 
Government could offer no limiting principle that would prevent 
congressional authority to regulate noneconomic activity under the 
Commerce Clause from becoming “a general federal police power,” id. at 
564, the federal ban on gun possession near schools could not be squared 
with the fundamental principle that the congressional “powers enumerated in 
the Constitution” must be “interpreted as having judicially enforceable outer 
limits.”  Id. at 566.  “[I]f we were to accept the Government’s arguments, we 
are hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is 
without power to regulate.” Id. at 564.  
The Lopez Court thus distilled from precedent the rule that the subject 
of the challenged congressional regulation must involve “economic 
activity.”  514 U.S. at 559, 560, 561, 567.  The Lopez analysis compels 
invalidation of the Individual Mandate.  For even assuming that an 
individual’s decision not to buy health insurance is economic in nature, it is 
plainly not activity.  It is, indeed, a decision to refrain from activity, to 
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remain outside the stream of commerce by choosing not to purchase health 
insurance.  It is, in short, inactivity.  And Congress has never sought to 
regulate a commercial market by commanding unwilling individuals to enter 
it.  To the contrary, “[e]very application of Commerce Clause power found 
to be constitutionally sound by the Supreme Court involved some form of 
action, transaction, or deed placed in motion by an individual or legal 
entity.”  Commonwealth v. Sebelius, No. 10-188, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
130814, at *37-38 (E.D.Va. Dec. 13, 2010).  See id. at *39 (“Neither the 
Supreme Court nor any federal circuit court of appeals has extended 
Commerce Clause powers to compel an individual to involuntarily enter the 
stream of commerce by purchasing a commodity in the private market.”).  
Indeed, when legislation imposing an Individual Mandate was first 
considered (but not enacted) by Congress 16 years ago, the Congressional 
Budget Office (“CBO”) concluded that “[a] mandate requiring all 
individuals to purchase health insurance would be an unprecedented form of 
federal action. The government has never required people to buy any good 
or service as a condition of lawful residence in the United States.” CBO 
MEMORANDUM at 1. 
The court below agreed that federal commerce power is limited to the 
regulation of “activities,” Liberty Univ., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125922, at 
Case: 10-2347   Document: 17    Date Filed: 01/25/2011    Page: 14
 10
*39-44, but it nevertheless adopted the Government’s position that an 
individual’s decision not to enter the marketplace constitutes the requisite 
“activity.”  The court reasoned that almost everyone will eventually need 
health care and that, by choosing to finance such care by means other than 
buying insurance now, “one becomes an active market participant, not a 
passive bystander,” in the health care market.  Id. at *43.  Thus, “an 
individual’s decision not to purchase health insurance is a form of economic 
activity.” Id. at *44.  This conclusion, according to the district court, 
“follows from the Supreme Court’s rulings” in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 
111 (1942), and Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).  Id. at *50.  It does 
not. 
Wickard upheld a federal price-support program that penalized a 
farmer for growing more than his statutory allotment of wheat, even though 
he used it solely for his own family and livestock.  The Supreme Court 
reasoned that Congress could rationally conclude that a decision by many 
farmers to grow their own wheat, rather than entering the marketplace to buy 
grain, could in the aggregate affect prices and undermine the congressional 
program.  Here, according to the court below, “Plaintiffs’ preference for 
paying for health care needs out of pocket rather than by purchasing 
insurance on the market is much like the preference of the plaintiff farmer in 
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Wickard for fulfilling his demand for wheat by growing his own rather than 
by purchasing it.”  Id.  But the congressional scheme at issue in Wickard 
imposed a penalty not on farmer Filburn’s mere passive “preference,” but on 
his affirmative activity of actually producing grain.  Wickard, 317 U.S. at 
127-29.  Production of wheat or any other commodity fits easily within the 
Supreme Court’s definition of “activities” that “are quintessentially 
economic.  ‘Economics’ refers to ‘the production, distribution, and 
consumption of commodities.’ ” Raich, 545 U.S. at 25.  See also Lopez, 514 
U.S. at 559-60 (describing Wickard as involving “intrastate economic 
activity” in the form of “production and consumption of homegrown 
wheat”).  The regulation at issue in Wickard, unlike the Individual Mandate, 
did not command farmer Filburn to grow wheat, nor did it compel him, or 
anyone else, to buy it.  Rather, Congress subjected farmer Filburn to federal 
regulation only if, and when, he voluntarily engaged in the activity of 
producing wheat.   
The district court points to the problem of “free riders” – those who 
do not buy health insurance but then demand free treatment in hospital 
emergency rooms when they get sick, thereby shifting the cost of their care 
to the hospital, the government, or other insured parties (in the form of 
higher premiums), since hospitals that participate in Medicare are forbidden 
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from refusing medical treatment on the basis of ability to pay.  Liberty Univ., 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125922, at *41-43.  But that problem is of Congress’ 
own creation, and it cannot bootstrap itself into powers not enumerated by 
the Constitution simply because it deems the exercise of those powers to be 
useful in light of other regulations that it has previously enacted.  A federal 
program, for example, requiring federally subsidized grocers to provide free 
bread to those who cannot afford to buy it would not authorize a federal 
regulation compelling Filburn and other farmers to grow wheat to ensure a 
low-cost supply.  Congress can constitutionally address the harshness of 
turning away those without health insurance in a variety of ways, including 
subsidizing – as it does currently in the Affordable Care Act – those who 
cannot otherwise afford such insurance.   
The Supreme Court’s decision in Raich, which was controlled by 
Wickard, is equally inapposite.  Marijuana growers, like wheat farmers, are 
voluntarily engaging in a classic form of economic activity – the production 
of an agricultural commodity.  See Commonwealth v. Sebelius, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 130814, at *35 (in Wickard and Raich, “the activity under 
review was the product of a self-directed affirmative move to cultivate and 
consume wheat or marijuana. This self-initiated change of position 
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voluntarily placed the subject within the stream of commerce.  Absent that 
step, governmental regulation could have been avoided.”).  
The Government also relies on Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United 
States, 379 U.S. 241, 243, 251 (1964), which held that Congress has 
Commerce Clause power to ban racial discrimination in public 
accommodations whose operations directly affect interstate travel.  The 
Government contends that, because the motel owner was compelled to 
engage in commercial transactions with a class of travelers he did not want 
to serve, Congress was regulating inactivity.  But the motel owner chose to 
enter the stream of commerce by operating an inn, thereby assuming the 
legal duties, both federal and state, imposed on such “public 
accommodations.” See 379 U.S. at 259-60 & n.8; id. at 284-85 (Douglas, J., 
concurring).2 
                                              
2 Under the Government’s sweeping theory of commerce power, 
Congress would presumably have been free, upon finding that there was an 
acute shortage of hotel rooms available to black travelers, to mandate that all 
homeowners turn their homes into boarding houses and make rooms 
available to travelers.  See Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 252-53 (recounting 
congressional findings of just such a shortage).  Yet in Heart of Atlanta, 
Congress mandated nondiscriminatory accommodations only by “those 
establishments which had certain commercial characteristics,” 379 U.S. at 
288 (appendix to opinion of Douglas, J., concurring), and specifically 
exempted any establishment with no more than five rooms to rent “which is 
actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as his residence.” 
Id. at 262 (appendix to the opinion of the Court)(quoting §201(b)(1) of the 
Civil Rights Act).  
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B. The Government’s Supposed Statutory and Lower 
Court Precedents Likewise Involved No Regulation of 
Inactivity. 
 
Remarkably, the Government insists that federal laws mandating the 
purchase of insurance are commonplace, which supposedly makes it “well-
settled that Congress may require private parties to enter into insurance 
contracts where failing to do so would impose costs on other market 
participants.” Govt. Reply Mem. at 13 & n.10 (citing nine statutes).  But 
every statute cited by the Government applies to particular economic acts or 
endeavors, and requires any “owner” or “operator” of such property – 
ranging from railroads to coal mines to property in flood zones – to buy 
particular types of insurance covering risks attendant to such an activity.  See 
id.  In each case, the owner or operator entered the marketplace voluntarily 
and chose to buy or operate that property, and likewise remained free to 
avoid the insurance obligation by quitting the enterprise.  Such laws, even if 
they had ever been sustained over a constitutional challenge – and the 
Government cites no such judicial authority – do not regulate inactivity and 
they therefore provide no support for the Individual Mandate here. 
 In its quest for precedents for the Individual Mandate, the 
Government travels even farther afield, pointing out that, under the 
Superfund Act, a property owner cannot avoid strict liability for 
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environmental clean-up costs by showing that he did not cause the toxic-
waste leak.   Govt. Reply Mem. at 13-14.  This, says the Government, 
proves that the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to impose mandates 
on those who are “passive” or “inactive.”  But any owner of a facility subject 
to Superfund regulation voluntarily entered the stream of commerce and 
thereby accepted the risk of strict liability imposed by federal regulation in 
connection with that economic activity.3 
 The Government also touts a case sustaining the Child Support 
Recovery Act, which “affirmatively requires child support payments in 
interstate commerce.” Govt. Reply Mem. at 13 & n.9 (citing United States v. 
Sage, 92 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1996)).  But that statute merely provides a federal 
mechanism for enforcing state-court child-support orders when a parent 
leaves the state and defaults on his legal responsibilities.  In such cases the 
duty to make child-support payments is imposed by state, not federal, law.  
See Sage, 92 F.3d at 103-04.  And states have plenary police power to 
                                              
3 The only superfund case cited by the Government that presented a 
Commerce Clause question – although not the question presented here – is 
United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997).  There the court 
rejected the defendant’s assertions that a statute must regulate commercial 
activity “directly” in order to satisfy the Commerce Clause, and that the 
government had to show that defendant’s activities, in particular, affected 
interstate commerce. See id. at 1510-11.  The case raised no question about 
congressional power to impose mandates that compel persons to enter the 
stream of commerce and buy products they do not want.  
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mandate affirmative duties; the Commerce and Necessary and Proper 
Clauses grant no such power to Congress.  The Government’s reliance on 
this example is thus telling, for it reveals that the Government does not grasp 
the “first principles” that the Supreme Court stressed in Lopez: “The 
Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers.  See U.S. 
Const. Art. I, § 8.  As James Madison wrote, ‘the powers delegated by the 
proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those 
which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.’ ”  
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 292-293 (C. 
Rossiter ed. 1961)). 
The Government’s next supposed precedent for the Individual 
Mandate is congressional use of “eminent domain to compel the private 
transfer of land in aid of the regulation of interstate commerce.” Govt. Reply 
Mem. at 14.  But the distinctions between eminent domain and the 
Individual Mandate subvert, rather than support, the Government’s position.  
First, the power of eminent domain inheres in sovereignty and is steeped in 
centuries of common law dating back to Magna Carta.  The Government 
identifies no similar pedigree for the Individual Mandate, nor could it, since 
even congressional authorities concede that this assertion of federal power is 
wholly unprecedented. See CBO MEMORANDUM at iv, 1-2.  Second, federal 
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eminent domain power cannot be doubted, for the Fifth Amendment 
expressly provides that private property cannot “be taken for public use 
without just compensation.”  Congressional eminent domain authority is 
thus tantamount to an enumerated power, as the Supreme Court explained 
more than a century ago.  See Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 574 (1897) 
(“In the Fifth Article of the earliest amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States … the inherent and necessary power of the Government to 
appropriate private property to the public use is recognized.”).  Third, the 
eminent domain power imposes a mandate more on the government than on 
the individual.  Far from imposing a coercive monetary penalty on property 
owners, as the Individual Mandate does, the Fifth Amendment requires that 
the federal government pay just compensation to property owners.  
Moreover, those owners entered the stream of commerce voluntarily by 
acquiring their property, and although owners can be compelled to sell their 
property for public use, not even the Government argues that eminent 
domain would allow Congress to compel an individual to buy property that 
he does not want.  The contrasts between the Individual Mandate and the 
Fifth Amendment’s eminent domain power are stark – and dispositive. 
The other examples of affirmative mandates invoked by the 
Government are likewise rooted in specific provisions enumerated in the 
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Constitution.  See Commonwealth v. Sebelius, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
130814, at *34.  The power to impose a military draft arises from Congress’ 
power to raise an army and navy.  See U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cls. 12-13.  
The power to compel the filing of tax returns arises from Congress’ power to 
levy taxes, including taxes on individuals.  See U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 1; 
U.S. Const. Amend. XVI.  The power to require the filing of census forms 
arises from Congress’ duty to conduct an “enumeration” of the population 
every ten years, in order to ensure fair democratic representation. See U.S. 
Const. Art. I, § 2, cl. 3.  And the power to compel service on a jury is rooted 
in the federal government’s duty to provide jury trials for both civil and 
criminal disputes.  See U.S. Const. Amends. VI and VII.  The Government 
can offer no remotely comparable constitutional foundation for the 
Individual Mandate. 
Finally, nothing in these constitutional mandates “would bid fair to 
convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general 
police power of the sort retained by the States.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.  The 
Government’s unbounded vision of the Commerce and the Necessary and 
Proper Clauses, in contrast, would effectively free the federal government of 
any meaningful limits on the scope of its commerce power, as we 
demonstrate below.   
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C. The Government Proffers No Genuine Limiting 
Principle to Contain a Commerce Clause Power That 
Is Not Tethered To Any Activity, Let Alone to 
Economic Activity.  
 
1. The Government’s assertion that the health care 
market is “unique” does not furnish a limiting 
principle and, in any event, is wrong. 
  
In Lopez, as noted earlier, the Supreme Court struck down a federal 
gun-possession statute because the Government’s “hip bone connected to the 
thigh bone” theory explaining why gun possession near a school 
substantially affects interstate commerce had no articulable limits; the 
Government could not identify a single activity that did not, under its theory, 
substantially affect interstate commerce.  Nor could the Court:  “[I]f we were 
to accept the Government's arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any 
activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate.”  514 
U.S. at 564.  See also id. at 565 (the dissent’s “rationale lacks any real limits 
because, depending on the level of generality, any activity can be looked 
upon as commercial”).  Upholding Congress’ claimed authority to regulate 
noneconomic activity that is not even remotely connected to interstate 
commerce, such as simple gun possession, would thus negate the central 
premise of federalism:  that the Constitution’s enumeration of congressional 
powers “ ‘presupposes something not enumerated.’ ”  Id. at 566 (quoting 
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 70 (1824)).   
Case: 10-2347   Document: 17    Date Filed: 01/25/2011    Page: 24
 20
The Individual Mandate presents the same problem, and the 
Government’s only answer is that the health care market is “unique.”  It 
argues that upholding the Individual Mandate will “not open the floodgates” 
to similar congressional mandates in other markets because “[t]he distinctive 
characteristics of the health care market – a combination of universal need, 
unavoidable uncertainty, and the associated cost-shifting – make it unique.” 
Govt. Reply Mem. at 12.  The court below adopted this rationale.  Liberty 
Univ., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125922, at *48-51. 
This supposed limit on individual mandates fails both as a matter of 
principle and as a matter of fact.  Congress’ exercise of its power to regulate 
economic activity under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses is 
not conditioned on the “uniqueness” of the market at issue.  Accordingly, 
although the supposedly “distinctive characteristics” of the health care 
market, even if true, might provide policy reasons why Congress would 
choose not to enact individual mandates in other areas, they certainly are not 
constitutional reasons why Congress could not.  Only the latter can provide a 
judicially enforceable principle to cabin Congress’ exercise of its commerce 
power.  And the Government’s blithe assurance that a decision expanding 
invasive regulatory power to unprecedented lengths will be like “a restricted 
railroad ticket, ‘good for this day and train only,’ ” County of Washington v. 
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Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 183 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), is fanciful at 
best.  Indeed, in Lopez the dissenting Justices likewise urged that 
congressional regulation of gun possession near schools was a “rare case,” 
due to the “particularly acute threat” posed by firearms and the “special way 
in which guns and education are incompatible.”  514 U.S. at 624 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting).   The Lopez Court rejected the supposed “rare case” limitation as 
“devoid of substance.” Id. at 564-65.    
In any event, the markets for health insurance and health care are 
plainly not unique.  Let us start with other insurance markets.  Ironically, on 
the very page after it asserts that health insurance is unique, and is therefore 
the only market in which Congress could impose an individual mandate, the 
Government trumpets a host of federal statutes mandating various forms of 
casualty, liability, and unemployment insurance for those who choose to 
engage in particular economic enterprises. Govt. Reply Mem. at 13 & n.10.  
Although we have already demonstrated that these laws provide no 
precedent for the Individual Mandate at issue here, see supra Part II.B, it is 
noteworthy that the Government itself believes there are many insurance 
markets in which Congress may impose individual mandates for the benefit 
of “other market participants.” Govt. Reply Mem. at 13.   
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Nor would the Government’s rationale stop at mandates affecting the 
insurance markets.  Food, shelter, clothing, transportation, education, and 
communication are all basic necessities of modern life, and everyone must 
eventually participate in some way in the markets for these goods and 
services.  The Government offers no reason why Congress could not choose 
to regulate these markets with individual mandates.  Under the 
Government’s rationale, for example, Congress would be empowered to 
regulate grain prices not only by penalizing wheat production in excess of 
the government’s quota, as it did in Wickard, but by penalizing individuals 
who decide not to enter the market as consumers of bread and other grain 
products.     
In short, market disruptions, inefficiencies, and cost-shifting are not 
unique to the health care and health insurance markets, and the Government 
provides no constitutional principle that would restrain Congress from 
addressing problems in other markets with its newly claimed power to 
compel individuals to enter the stream of commerce and buy products that 
they do not want.  Long before this litigation arose, Congress’ own non-
partisan Congressional Budget Office gave credence to an outlook very 
different from the brisk, rosy assurances offered by the Government here.   
When the CBO reviewed the first bill contemplating an individual mandate 
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16 years ago and concluded that such a measure was unprecedented, the 
CBO observed that federal budgets have always distinguished between 
“resource allocation decisions that involve private choice, are made in a 
decentralized fashion, and are subject to the economic disciplines of the 
marketplace, and resource allocation decisions that are made in a centralized 
fashion at the federal level by the President and the Congress through the 
governmental budget process.” CBO MEMORANDUM at 4 (quotation marks 
and citation omitted).  The CBO reasoned that “the essence of private choice 
is the ability not to act.  Decisions about resource allocation are not private 
unless individuals can choose not to spend their money in response to 
market forces.” Id. at 7 (emphasis in original).  Congress’ budget experts had 
to confront these issues because enactment of a mandate would have 
required a decision about how the mandate should be treated for federal 
budget purposes.  With the degree of control that the federal government 
would exert over mandated purchases of health insurance by individuals 
who had been conscripted into commerce by congressional decree, the CBO 
was concerned that the cost to individuals of complying with the mandate 
ought to be counted as part of the federal budget.  Id. at 6-7.  The CBO then 
offered this chilling warning:  
Failure to record the cost of this compulsory activity in the 
budget would open the door to a mandate-issuing government 
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taking control of virtually any resource allocation decision that 
would otherwise be left to the private sector, without the federal 
budget recording any increase in the size of government.  In the 
extreme, a command economy, in which the President and the 
Congress dictated how much each individual and family spent 
on all goods and services, could be instituted without any 
change in total federal receipts or outlays. 
CBO MEMORANDUM at 9.   
2. A statute is not “proper” under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause if it would negate the purpose, 
embodied in Article I and the Ninth and Tenth 
Amendments, of enumerating, and thereby 
limiting, federal power.  
 
The Government’s argument that the Individual Mandate is 
“essential” to its “larger regulatory scheme for the interstate health care 
market,” Liberty Univ., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125922, at *52, even if 
credited, goes only to the “Necessary” element of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.4  Even a “necessary” exercise of Commerce Clause authority must 
also be “a ‘Law …  proper for carrying into Execution the Commerce 
Clause.’ ”  Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923-24 (1997) (quoting 
                                              
4 The “necessity” identified by the Government, at bottom, is the need 
for additional monetary resources.  But the Internal Revenue Code is a 
testament to the innumerable ways in which revenues can be raised in accord 
with the Constitution, and thus a justification based on a need for additional 
resources is one of least compelling showings of “necessity” imaginable.  If 
Congress needs more money to pay for its health care reforms, it has plenty 
of constitutional options available to it. 
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Art. I, § 8, cl. 18) (emphasis added by the Court).5  In Chief Justice 
Marshall’s words, for a law to be “proper,” it must “consist with the letter 
and spirit of the Constitution.”  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 
(1819).  The Individual Mandate fails this test because it is inconsistent with 
– indeed, it negates – the “first principle[]” that Article I “creates a Federal 
Government of enumerated powers” that are “ ‘few and defined.’ ”  Lopez, 
514 U.S. at 552 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 45).  Under the Government’s 
theory, Congress can impress unwilling individuals into commerce and 
compel them to buy unwanted products whenever doing so is deemed by 
Congress to be essential to some larger regulatory plan.6   
That makes this case actually easier to decide than Lopez.  There, the 
Supreme Court balked at the degree of attenuation in the causal connection 
between the regulated “actors” and the ultimate effect of “their conduct” on 
commerce.  514 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also id. at 559-
61, 565-67 (opinion of the Court).  Although the Court admitted that “some 
of our prior cases have taken long steps down [the] road” toward granting 
Congress a general police power by “giving great deference to 
                                              
5 It is this sort of catch-all analysis that has made the Necessary and 
Proper Clause the “last, best hope of those who defend ultra vires 
congressional action.” Printz, 521 U.S. at 923.  
6 When the British navy impressed Americans into service in 1812, 
President James Madison deemed it casus belli.   
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congressional” programs regulating activities with remote effects on 
commerce, id. at 567, the Court drew the line at “a criminal statute that by 
its terms has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic 
enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms.”  Id. at 561.   
But the Individual Mandate strains the concept of commerce even 
more than the gun possession statute in Lopez, for it reflects not a difference 
in degree from prior exercises of Commerce Clause power, but a difference 
in kind.  Again, the Individual Mandate reaches beyond economic “actors” 
to command even those who have decided not to act; it regulates not 
“activity” but inactivity.  And ordering unwilling individuals into the 
marketplace to buy unwanted products goes where even Congress has 
heretofore never ventured.7  Far from what Chief Justice Marshall described 
as “the natural, direct and appropriate means, or the known and usual 
means, for the execution of a given power,” JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF 
MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 186 (Gerald Gunther ed. 1969) (emphasis 
                                              
7 Indeed, Congress’ own staff warned that the Individual Mandate 
may exceed its powers, noting that it may “be questioned whether a 
requirement to purchase health insurance is really a regulation of an 
economic activity or enterprise, if individuals who would be required to 
purchase health insurance are not, but for this regulation, a part of the health 
insurance market.”  CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT, Requiring 
Individuals to Obtain Health Insurance: A Constitutional Analysis 6 (2009) 
(emphasis added).   
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added), the Individual Mandate is the ultimate form of congressional 
bootstrapping:  unwilling individuals are first drafted into the health 
insurance market and then their involuntary participation in that market is 
used to justify the mandate as an exercise of the Commerce Clause.   
This is, in Alexander Hamilton’s phrase, “merely [an] act of 
usurpation” which “deserves to be treated as such.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, 
at 204 (quoted in Printz, 521 U.S. at 924).  And because this usurpation of 
general police power leaves no apparent “activity that the States may 
regulate but Congress may not,” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564, the Individual 
Mandate encroaches on the reserved sovereign powers of the States in 
violation of the Tenth Amendment.   
But that is not all.  To uphold the claim of congressional power 
underlying the Individual Mandate would also fundamentally alter the very 
nature of the relationship between the federal government and the governed.  
That relationship is defined, in large part, by the limitations on federal 
regulation inherent in the Constitution’s enumeration of congressional 
powers.  Central to the Framers’ concept of republican government was the 
belief that the enumerated powers of the federal government are reciprocally 
related to the retained rights of the people.  By delegating certain legislative 
powers to the national government, the people consented to abide by the 
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laws enacted by the federal government pursuant to those powers.  But as to 
those matters over which the national government had no enumerated power, 
the people had a retained right to do as they pleased, free of federal 
regulation.  See Charles Cooper, Limited Government and Individual 
Liberty: The Ninth Amendment’s Forgotten Lessons, 4 J. OF L. & POLITICS 
63, 64 (1987).  Indeed, many of the Framers opposed the incorporation of a 
Bill of Rights in the Constitution for fear that an attempt to “enumerate” the 
rights of the people would carry the risk that any omission from the list 
would be construed to grant Congress an implied, unenumerated power to 
legislate on the subject at issue.  Id. at 69-70.8  The Framers sought to 
protect against this danger with the Ninth Amendment’s guaranty that “[t]he 
enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to 
deny or disparage others retained by the people.”       
                                              
8 This concern was succinctly expressed by James Wilson in the 
Pennsylvania ratifying convention:  “If we attempt an enumeration [of 
rights], every thing that is not enumerated is presumed to be given.  The 
consequence is, that an imperfect enumeration would throw all implied 
power into the scale of the government, and the rights of the people would 
be rendered incomplete.”  2 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS 
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 436 (reprint 1966) (J. 
Elliot 2d ed. 1836) (statement of J. Wilson at Pennsylvania Ratifying 
Convention, Oct. 28, 1787).  Wilson thought that “an omission in the 
enumeration of the powers of government is neither so dangerous nor 
important as an omission in the enumeration of the rights of the people.”  Id. 
at 436-437. 
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In short, the limited and enumerated “powers granted” to the national 
government in Article I and the unlimited and unenumerated “rights 
retained” by the people in the Ninth Amendment are two sides of the same 
coin.  See THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 432 (G. Hunt. Ed. 1904) (letter 
to G. Washington dated Dec. 5, 1789).  And the Framers conceived of the 
people’s reserved rights as ranging from the fundamental to the mundane, 
from the rights of free speech and assembly to an individual’s “right to wear 
his hat if he pleased.”9  There is little doubt that, somewhere along that 
continuum, the Framers would have placed the right of an individual to 
decide for herself which products and services she wishes to buy.10  After 
all, as the Government concedes, the event that triggers imposition of the 
                                              
9 During the debates on the Bill of Rights, Congressman Sedgwick of 
Massachusetts objected that no amendment protecting free assembly was 
needed, for “it is a self-evident, inalienable right which the people possess 
… [and] that never would be called in question.”  He argued that, if 
Congress were going to “descend to such minutiae,” it may as well “have 
declared that a man should have a right to wear his hat if he pleased; that he 
might get up when he pleased, and go to bed when he thought proper; but [I] 
would ask the gentleman whether he thought it necessary to enter these 
trifles in a declaration of rights, in a Government where none of them were 
intended to be infringed.” 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 759 (J. Gales & W. 
Seaton ed. 1834). 
10 The right not to buy an unwanted product has an honored American 
pedigree.  The colonists in Boston and elsewhere boycotted tea and other 
products bearing the imprimatur of the Crown, and even King George III did 
not claim a sovereign power to compel his American subjects to buy English 
products.   
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Individual Mandate – and its penalties – is a decision not to act.  And even if 
the decision not to buy a product can fairly be characterized as an economic 
decision, the fact remains that the only regulated event is the naked decision 
itself – the mental process of thinking.  The Government’s defense of the 
Individual Mandate thus rests on a twisted revision of Descartes’ syllogism:  
“I think (about commerce), therefore I am (engaging in commerce).”  But 
the Constitution sounds in law, not metaphysics, and there is no place in a 
federal government of limited and enumerated powers for this sort of 
Cartesian Commerce Clause. 11    
CONCLUSION 
A federal law that conscripts state officials into participating in a 
federal regulatory regime enacted under the Commerce Clause infringes on 
the reserved state sovereignty protected by the Tenth Amendment.  See 
Printz, 521 U.S. at 925, 928, 935.  The Individual Mandate goes farther, 
                                              
11 Certainly the monetary punishment imposed by the federal 
government for thinking about not buying health insurance is no mere 
philosophical exercise.  Although “governments need and have ample power 
to punish . . . acts,” it “does not follow that they must have a further power 
to punish thought . . . as distinguished from acts.”  Wieman v. Updegraff, 
344 U.S. 183, 193 (1952) (Black, J., concurring).  Contemplating even the 
most heinous crime is not punishable until one commits an overt act or 
actively conspires with others.  See United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 
16 (1994) (the law “does not punish mere thought; the criminal agreement 
itself is the actus reus”). 
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invading not only the State’s constitutionally protected sphere of sovereign 
autonomy, but the individual’s.  If Congress’ power to regulate interstate 
commerce is expanded to enable it to force individual citizens to buy 
products they do not want, then little if anything will be left of the retained 
rights guaranteed by the Ninth Amendment, or of the distinction between a 
citizen and a subject.12  Accordingly, amicus curiae respectfully submits that 
the judgment of the court below should be reversed and the case remanded 
for further proceedings. 
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12 “[T]he term citizen brings into prominence the rights and privileges 
of the status, rather than its correlative obligations, while the reverse is the 
case with the term subject.” John William Salmond, JURISPRUDENCE § 39 
(2d ed. 1907).    
Case: 10-2347   Document: 17    Date Filed: 01/25/2011    Page: 36
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No.  _______ Caption:  __________________________________________________
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 28.1(e) or 32(a)
Certificate of Compliance With Type-Volume Limitation,
Typeface Requirements, and Type Style Requirements
1. This brief complies with the  type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P. 28.1(e)(2) or
32(a)(7)(B) because: 
[Appellant’s Opening Brief, Appellee’s Response Brief, and Appellant’s Response/Reply Brief may
not exceed 14,000 words or 1,300 lines; Appellee’s Opening/Response Brief may not exceed 16,500
words or 1,500 lines; any Reply or Amicus Brief may not exceed 7,000 words or 650 lines; line count
may be used only with monospaced type]
[  ] this brief contains                           [state the number of] words, excluding the parts
of the brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii), or
[  ] this brief uses a monospaced typeface and contains                           [state the number
of] lines of text, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P.
32(a)(7)(B)(iii).
2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and the type
style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because:
[14-point font must be used with proportional typeface, such as Times New Roman or CG Times;
12-point font must be used with monospaced typeface, such as Courier or Courier New]
[  ] this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using                     
              [state name and version of word processing program] in                           
                                 [state font size and name of the type style]; or
[  ] this brief has been prepared in a monospaced typeface using                                    
             [state name and version of word processing program] with                        
                                   [state number of characters per inch and name of type style].
(s)                                                             
Attorney for                                                
Dated:                              
10-2347 Liberty University et al. v. Geithner et al.
✔ 6,976
✔ Microsoft Word
2003 Times New Roman
Size 14 Font
Charles J. Cooper
Revere America Foundation
1/25/2011
Case: 10-2347   Document: 17    Date Filed: 01/25/2011    Page: 37
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
************************** 
 
I certify that on January 25, 2011 the foregoing document was served on all parties 
or their counsel of record through the CM/ECF system if they are registered users 
or, if they are not, by serving a true and correct copy at the addresses listed below: 
 
Anita Leigh Staver 
Mathew D. Staver 
LIBERTY COUNSEL  
1055 Maitland Center Commons 
Maitland, FL 32751-0000 
 
Stephen Melvin Crampton 
LIBERTY COUNSEL  
P. O. Box 11108 
Lynchburg, VA 24506-1108 
 
     
         
        s/Charles J. Cooper  
         
Case: 10-2347   Document: 17    Date Filed: 01/25/2011    Page: 38
